

29 December 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Administration - Special)

FOR: Senior Review Committee Consideration

FROM: Task Force

SUBJECT: Physical Security at Field Installations.

Problem:

Consideration should be given to the desirability of establishing minimum standards or criteria for physical security at field installations; the extent to which this is possible; the development and perpetuation of a system for the processing of other factors upon which physical security is dependent, such as briefing and cover of dependents and training of operational personnel in techniques of physical security; and the definition and delegation of authority necessary to implement such a standardized program.

Discussion:

- A. Physical security at field installations is not uniform in policy, procedure, or method of implementation and there are no general standards or criteria for field operators to use as a guide. The security of each installation is an individual operation and is left to the discretion of the station chief to be adapted to circumstances as he may interpret them.
1. Agency Regulations make no provision for minimum standards of physical security at field installations.
 2. There is no general provision for Agency control over, or guidance to, station chiefs to meet problems of physical security of either a general nature or of a nature peculiar to the circumstances at a given installation.
 3. There is no administrative or operational mechanism in the Agency for supervision of existing physical security at field installations.

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4. The Inspection and Security Office has no policies or procedures for effective control or guidance of the physical security in foreign installations, and [REDACTED] any other official to establish physical security standards.

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5. [REDACTED] provide for making clear distinctions between that which is purely physical security and that which is personal security.

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- a. No criteria or standards exist for establishing a clear relationship between physical security of an installation and personal security of operational personnel.

- b. That the problem exists has been recognized, but it is met only in relation to the particular circumstances on the basis of the judgment of persons involved.

- c. There is no provision for reference to an optimum desirable method which would provide a flexible framework to which particular circumstances might be adapted.

6. Differences between circumstances which are a security concern and those which are the concern of counterespionage are not recognized [REDACTED] and there is no standard within which it might be possible to establish a clear distinction.

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7. There is no provision for training of field personnel in the general philosophy of physical security, or in the techniques, methods, mechanisms, etc., for protecting physical security, which would tend to reduce the inadequacies in the present [REDACTED] controls.

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
8. A further ramification of the problem related directly to physical security is briefing and cover of dependents.

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- a. [REDACTED] do not prescribe policy or procedure for briefing of dependents at the time an individual is appointed, prior to departure for overseas station, or upon return from overseas.


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B.



Inspection and Security Office has not been concerned with physical security in field installations and state that they do not have information available which would enable them to provide detailed procedures for the handling of this problem.

Representatives of the Inspection and Security Office express the belief that the operating Offices are in the best position to develop a desirable and acceptable standard. However, representatives of OPC and OSO feel the Inspection and Security Office should, as a service, prepare a statement to be submitted as an optimum standard for the operator to use as a guide. They suggest that a statement of this kind should be flexible and able to accommodate any adjustment which might be necessary to meet the peculiarities of individual station circumstances of physical security. Procedures might be developed whereby inability of a particular station to conform to the established standard could be adjusted through advice and guidance rendered by I&S, if particular circumstances warranted specialized information. Where the lack of conformance

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is of a minor nature, the points of inconsistency with the standard might be adjusted by the responsible chief of station. In cases of this kind, the chief of station would submit a detailed plan for adjusting the inequities, an explanation of factors which make conformance to the standard impossible, and a justification for the action taken and adjustments made.

There is some controversy over the extent to which authority for review and control of physical security methods should rest with I&S. The difficulty of clearly defining differences between security of operations and physical security is a paramount issue. The operating official is charged with the secure completion of his mission. Physical security factors are inextricably a part of the operation itself, the feeling therefore being that the chief of station is responsible and should not be held accountable to I&S. The reliability of personnel and personal security is similar in nature inasmuch as secure performance of an activity is dependent upon the reliability of the persons involved in the operation. Controls over personnel in the field are much more tenuous than controls over headquarters personnel. It therefore becomes a difficult problem to accurately establish standards to determine what problems are the concern of I&S and what problems are counter-espionage, and what authorities I&S could exert over field personnel other than staff employees.

Discussions with representatives of the operating Offices have indicated a feeling that problems of implementation and enforcement of security standards are properly the responsibility of the operating official concerned. If I&S is, or should be, concerned at all, it should be purely in an advisory capacity to lend assistance in developing precautions. Controls and review of existing conditions must be the primary responsibility of the operator. I&S cannot become involved because of difficulties inherent in providing cover for individuals whose functions would be to check and control factors of physical security. There is feeling that the continued or periodic inspection of field installations by I&S personnel would in itself and by its nature introduce a security hazard relatively greater than would be likely to occur with the operation left strictly to the control and review of the responsible installation chief.

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There is strong resistance against any suggestion that I&S personnel be attached to stations because of the likelihood of conflicting responsibilities and authorities. The intricate nature of operations is such that an I&S person attached to an installation could only perform his function by becoming thoroughly familiar with all operations of the station. It is contended that an arrangement of this kind would require that the responsible person be an expert in operations as well as an authority in I&S. However, a parallel situation has been cited with regard to finance officers who have been assigned to some field installations to perform a service function. There is some opinion that I&S personnel might be assigned on a similar basis and with comparable status.

The position is taken, nevertheless, that any function which I&S might perform should only be undertaken within the strict limitations of guidance and advice and that final responsibility for security standards should rest with the chief of station under a delegation from the Assistant Director concerned.

Recommendations:


1. A special section of I&S should be established to accommodate the physical security requirements of overseas installations. This section would be charged with:
 - a. establishing standards of policy and procedure for implementing physical security at field installations;
 - b. developing a set of minimum criteria for installations of various types;
 - c. providing constant guidance and advice for physical security at field installations;
 - d. coordinating with the Director of Training to develop and implement training programs in physical security techniques, methods, mechanisms, etc., for overseas personnel;
 - e. coordinating with the operating offices to ensure that field installations are taking maximum precautions and attempting to improve techniques on a continuing plan;
 - f. providing operating offices with regular current reports of information on the latest developments in security techniques and mechanisms;

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- g. developing a composite system for briefing dependents, providing for credit references, and maintaining a centralized control over cover stories and circumstances surrounding their effective implementation and perpetuation.
2. The Advisor for Management should conduct a study of the I&S Office to determine the possibility of performing this additional function within the limitations of the present I&S staff, or the need for an increase in I&S T/O strength.
3. The new section should provide an advisory and guidance function with final responsibility for the security of installations and operations to rest with the chief of station.
4. 

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Enclosure: Tab A

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